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Abstract. This study explored the impact of resumption of former top executives on stock 
prices based on market model for the listed corporations in Taiwan stock market. Top ex-
ecutives nowadays confront great challenges in acquiring new corporate accounts to meet 
agreed targets and drive rapid, profitable growth. Accordingly, corporations commonly 
decide to reinstate former top executives since their managerial experience is expected to 
improve corporate performance. The aim of this study is to provide practical guidelines 
for companies that are considering such decisions and favorable information that can help 
investors to adjust their portfolios in response to such potential decisions.
Keywords: resumption, former top executives, stock prices, market model.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Yang, T.-N. 2013. The impact of 
resumption of former top executives on stock prices: an event study approach, Journal of 
Business Economics and Management 14(2): 292–302.
JEL Classification: G39, G18.
1. Introduction
A top executive who resume his or her former office will find that completely reinvent-
ing the company and re-injecting new blood is a major challenge. When their business 
environment is changing dramatically, enterprises are likely to change top executives 
in response to particular challenges, to achieve market dominance or to face the emer-
gence of new competitors. However, newly appointed top executives commonly lead 
companies into trouble because of poor short-term performance and improper decision-
making. As a result, a company may return a former top executive to his position. 
Although a veteran of a company may be well-versed in the overall operating profile 
of a company and identify problems, they tend to be conservative and are not good at 
exploiting new technologies for innovation (Mian 2001). In many cases, the perfor-
mance of top executives who resume their former offices is mixed: the stock price of the 
world’s largest coffee chain store, Starbucks, fell drastically when its founder Schultz 
resumed his former position. However, Dell reinvented the business model of Dell Inc.; 
and Apple’s top executives Steve Jobs has been called the most successful resuming top 
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executives, thanks to the his creative revolution of the company’s business strategy. The 
capabilities of one man, however, cannot produce more than the spirit of the team under 
him can support. Causes of success are worthy of exploration. Some top executives may 
be not willing to revolutionize the companies that they helped to develop when they 
held their position previously. The successful example of Apple Computer’s designing 
stunning new technological products, such as the iPod and the iPhone demonstrates the 
outstanding creativity of Steve Jobs and excellently organized teamwork.
Topics worthy of discussion include business performance before the announcement of 
the replacement of the top executives, the time between announcement and his resuming 
his role, and whether the staff of the firm and the familiarity of the new top executives 
with the business’s operations will support radical changes. Whether the replacement 
of top executives is good or bad for companies can be observed by the response of the 
stock price of the firm market. Additionally, the company’s business performance upon 
the announcement that the top executives will be replaced substantially affects the aver-
age cumulative abnormal returns. The newly-appointed top executives has no significant 
effect on market reaction (e.g. Warner et al. 1988; Lubatkin et al. 1989; Barro, J., Barro, 
R. 1990; Ball, Torous 1998; DeFonda, Park 1999). Some scholars believe that new top 
executives do less well than expected in terms of business revenue. Puffer and Wein-
trop (1991) argued that the revenue of a business following the appointment of new top 
executives is generally lower than expected by analysts.
The significant effect of the resumption of duty by top executives on the value of a 
company is evident, as is the inadequacy of studies of the resumption of duty by former 
top executives in Taiwan. According to the relevant regulations, the replacement of top 
executives is important information that should be publicly disclosed on the platform of 
the information system of Taiwan’s Stock Exchange within a time limit. 
2. Literature review 
Top executives who perform poorly are replaced by those with better capabilities to 
enhance corporate performance (Kaplan 1994; Goyal, Park 2002; Alas 2008; Valle-
jo-Martos 2011). The separation of ownership from management creates the agency 
problem: top executives make decisions and behave in a manner that maximizes their 
personal interest rather than the wealth of shareholders. To address the agency problem, 
a company normally limits the self-interested behaviors of its top executives by urg-
ing them to sign contracts with external shareholders. They have a significant impact 
on business performance and the way in which decisions are made at their companies. 
Theoretically, top executives, as their title suggests, are those who hold the most im-
portant posts in an organization; guide the overall operations of the company, such as 
replacing other employees in important posts; set business strategy, and make major 
decisions. Supporters of this theory believe that companies select experienced experts as 
leaders to improve organizational performance (Borokhovich et al. 1996; Lausten 2002; 
Ginevičius, Vaitkūnaitė 2006; Strandskov 2006; Curado, Manica 2010). 
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The theory “Ritual Scapegoating Theory”. Its adherents believe that the replacement of 
leadership has no impact on business performance; the replaced leader is a scapegoat 
for poor business performance (Kang, Shivdasani 1995; Nelson 2005). In studies of the 
relationship between the replacement of top executives and business performance, the 
theory is called the “common-sense theory”. An organization changes leadership when 
performance is poor, and so the vicious circle is set in motion (Parrino 1997; Conyon 
1998; Farrell, Whidbee 2002, 2003).
Owing to the changing environment and fierce market competition, the replacement of 
top executives, leadership styles, lengths of tenure and the organization of enterprises 
differ from those of the past (Marković 2008; Vallejo-Martos 2011). Top corporate ex-
ecutives must grasp the overall operations of an enterprise and its major decisions. The 
performance of executives who resume former offices should be evaluated against mar-
ket expectations. Such top executives tend to have experience of numerous enterprises, 
and they must face many challenges and develop new perspectives to drive change. 
If the enterprise is insufficiently competitive and lacks capacity, veterans of the firm 
cannot help. The return of top executives may facilita the improvement of business ef-
ficiency. The replacement of top executives somewhat affects the transfer of power and 
organizational changes. As well as the top executives, environmental factors, the age, 
size and performance of the organization, employee support and coordination are also 
major considerations. A change of top executives can be regarded as an enterprise. How-
ever, studies of the impact of the resumption of offices by top executives on business 
performance are few and the topic is overdue for exploration. Like the coordination of 
the external and internal environments of an organization and the benchmarks improve 
business performance. Leadership greatly affects the enterprise. 
This study investigates the impact of the return of former top executives on the stock 
prices of their enterprises; reviews the reactions of the stock prices, and discusses the 
value of the information that top executives are to resume their offices, using the event 
study methodology. The effect of the disclosure of information regarding the resump-
tion of old offices by top executives of publicly listed electronics companies in Taiwan 
is examined. Until now, most domestic discussions in the field have focused on such 
topics as changes of management, abnormal factors and the shareholder wealth effects 
without consideration of the impact of top executives’ resumption on the performance 
of stock price of their enterprises. 
3. Research method and data description
3.1. Sample period and data sources 
The research period of this study starts during 1995–2009, which comprised 21 re-
sumptions of duty by board directors and 50 by general managers. Most of the data 
concerning informational disclosures by the sample companies was downloaded from 
the “Public Information Observation Website” of Taiwan Stock Exchange. The purpose 
of this study aims to investigate the impact of top executives’ resuming offices on the 
stock prices of their companies. Therefore, resumptions of duty by top executives were 
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grouped into entrepreneurial resumptions of duty and general resumptions of duty. The 
resumption of duty by a top executive who is a founder of the company is an entrepre-
neurial resumption of duty. The raising of a general employee to a top executive office 
is regarded as the general resumption of duty. To provide more detailed analysis, these 
two of events were further categorized into the external and internal resumption of duty. 
The resumption of a top executive position by a company founder who has served in 
other companies after leaving the present company is an external resumption of duty. 
The transfer of a founder who was temporarily working in a particular department of a 
company back to a top executive position is an internal resumption of duty. 
Company stock price data are downloaded from the “Taiwan New Economic Journal 
(TEJ)” database. The purpose of this article was to determine whether entrepreneurial 
resumption of duty and general resumption of duty affect stock prices and rapidly be-
come public information. The impacts of the resumption of duty by top executives on 
stock prices are also explored. External resumption of duty refers to the situation in 
which a former top executive who has worked for other companies resumes his posi-
tion in the company of interest. In the following, we define five terms used in event 
study methodology and determine sample selection principles, research period and data 
sources. 
The observation period ran 121 trading days from the 105 trading days before the event 
date to the 15 trading days after the event date. The date of resumption of duty by a top 
executive is denoted as No. 0 transaction day, or “0”. No. t transaction day before the 
resumption of duty by a top executive is represented by “–t” while No. t transaction day 
after the resumption of duty by a top executive is represented by “+t”.
3.2. Research method
This study adopted the event study methodology (Brown, Warner 1980; Corhay, Tourani 
1994; Pantzalis et al. 2000; Chen, Su 2010; Lai et al. 2010; Wang, Chuang 2010) to 
analyze the impact of resumption of top executives on stock price before and after 
the announcement of such event. This method assumes that the market quickly and 
sufficiently responds to public information whenever specific events happen. Namely, 
when a company releases important information, its stock price quickly and sufficiently 
reflects this information. In addition, we also explored whether such event would lead 
to any abnormal return (AR) for the company.
3.2.1. Market model
The widely-used market model is utilized to examine the impact of information about 
the resumption of duty by a former top executive on stock price, and such information 
can result in AR (Wang et al. 2010; Yang et al. 2010). The market model in event study 
analysis was as follows.
 Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit,  (1)
where Rit and Rmt respectively denote the returns of the stock i and market in period t; αi 
is the intercept term; βi measures the system risk of the stock i, and εit is the error term.
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3.2.2. AR (Abnormal Return)
The event study methodology was utilized to identify the existence of abnormal return, 
which can be calculated by subtracting expected returns from actual returns. The equa-
tion is as follows: 
 
ˆ( ),= −it it itAR R E R   (2)
where ARit denotes the abnormal return of stock i in period t; Rit is the actual returns of 
company i in period t, and ˆ( )itE R  is the expected returns of stock i in period t. 
3.2.3. CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return)
As ARit is subject to the impact of error, the average of all cumulative abnormal returns 
after the event happened was used to reduce the impact of errors on the stock returns. 
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where the average AR from the specific date τ1 of the event period to τ2 th is added to 
obtain the CAR of that period; namely, the CAR of a total of τ days (τ = τ2 – τ1) from 
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The average AR and CAR can improve AR, in particular, the testing capabilities of the 
impacts on stock prices for specific events. 
4. Empirical result
4.1. Abnormal Returns (AR) upon return of Chairman and General Manager
Table 1 shows the results on the behavior of AR and its t-test statistics for Taiwan’s 
listed electronics stock on event window after the announcement dates of the resump-
tion of top executives. For the case of the return of Chairman, the 15th day (t = 1.9363) 
is associated with significantly positive AR. Additionally, in the 15 days following the 
event day, the 8th and the 10th days are associated with significantly negative AR. These 
evidences suggest the return of a Chairman has a significantly positive effect on stock 
prices before the event window because information is exposed to the public in advance. 
This result indicates that information may leak out before the announcement dates.
Upon the case of the return of a General Manager, in the 15 days before the event day, 
the 8th and 13th days are associated with significantly negative AR. In the 15 days fol-
lowing the event day, the first day is associated with a significantly negative AR, while 
the 4th and 9th are associated with significantly positive AR. These evidences suggest 
that investors respond differently before and after the announcement of the return of 
General Manager, which does not necessarily lead to a desirable impact on the market 
value of the company.
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Table 1. Results of AR on resumptions of Chairman and General Manager
Window
Chairman General Manager
AR t-test AR t-test
–15  0.989  1.9363* –0.053 –0.134
–14 –0.298 –0.584 –0.169 –0.426
–13 –0.498 –0.975 –0.683 –1.726*
–12 –0.127 –0.249 –0.338 –0.853
–11 –0.264 –0.516  0.195  0.492
–10 –0.104 –0.203 –0.150 –0.379
–9  0.067  0.139 –0.240 –0.606
–8  0.013  0.025 –0.676 –1.707*
–7 –0.337 –0.660 –0.275 –0.695
–6 –0.454 –0.888 –0.280 –0.708
–5 –0.029 –0.056 –0.103 –0.261
–4 –0.043 –0.084 –0.515 –1.301
–3  0.751  1.471 –0.119 –0.301
–2 –0.230 –0.450  0.054  0.135
–1 –0.383 –0.750 –0.4184 –1.057
0 –0.732 –1.434  0.037  0.094
1 –0.313 –0.613 –0.774 –1.956*
2  0.020  0.039 –0.065 –0.164
3  0.502  0.983  0.049  0.124
4  0.168  0.33  0.782  1.976*
5 –0.298 –0.583 –0.202 –0.510
6  0.107  0.210 –0.291 –0.736
7 –0.195 –0.382 –0.325 –0.822
8 –1.174 –2.300*  0.436  1.103
9  0.093  0.183  0.664  1.677*
10 –0.892 –1.747*  0.126  0.319
11  0.230  0.451  0.326  0.823
12 –0.768 –1.505 –0.560 –1.414
13 –0.074 –0.144  0.589  1.489
14 –0.501 –0.981 –0.114 –0.288
15 –0.231 –0.452 –0.082 –0.208
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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To summarize, as indicated by the empirical results of the returns of Chairman and 
General Manager, we can observe that information regarding their returns may leak out 
before the announcement dates so that investors are enable to respond to this informa-
tion in advance. Accordingly, abnormal returns occur. Also, around the announcement 
dates, different investors respond differently. Generally, the return of top executives 
does not significantly influence investors’ decisions. Also, negative abnormal returns can 
be observed regardless of the return of a Chairman and General Manager. A comparison 
of results concerning abnormal returns associated with returns of the Chairman and 
General Manager reveal that information regarding their returns may be leaked before 
the announcement date, so investors respond to stock prices in advance. 
Many studies pay attention to explore the relationship between top executives turnover 
and corporate performance, and ignore the returning of top executive. However, the em-
pirical results of this study indicate that the returning of top executives does not neces-
sarily result in improved performance of stock price, provided warning for investors that 
there is no need to overestimate the reformative impact of returning of top executives.
4.2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) upon return  
of Chairman and General Manager
Upon the return of a Chairman as shown in Table 2, the average cumulative abnormal 
returns are positive for four days (–15th ~ –12th) before the announcement date but turn 
negative after the announcement date until the 12th day. The response of the return of 
top executives is continuously negative after the event day. Moreover, in the 15 days 
before the event day, the 15th day is associated with significantly positive CAR. In 15 
days following the event day, the 14th and 15th are associated with significantly nega-
tive CAR. The return of a Chairman has a significantly positive effect on stock prices 
before the event window as information is provided to the public in advance. Upon the 
return of a General Manager, in the 15 days before the event day, the average cumula-
tive abnormal returns are negative before and after the announcement date, in which the 
CAR is significant negative from –8th to 10th days. 
The results for CAR upon the return of a Chairman and General Manager are compared. 
They demonstrate that the news of the return of a Chairman is likely to leak before the 
announcement date and investors respond to stock prices in advance. Accordingly, ab-
normal returns are identified. However, investors react negatively before and after the 
date of an announcement of the return of top executives, and particularly of the return 
of a General Manager. Therefore, the return of these officers does not bring about better 
prospects for the company. 
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Table 2. Results of CAR on resumptions of Chairman and General Manager
Window
Chairman General Managers
CAR t-test CAR t-test
–15  0.989  1.936* –0.053 –0.134
–14  0.690  0.956 –0.222 –0.396
–13  0.192  0.217 –0.904 –1.320
–12  0.065  0.064 –1.242 –1.569
–11 –0.199 –0.174 –1.047 –1.184
–10 –0.302 –0.242 –1.197 –1.235
–9 –0.236 –0.174 –1.437 –1.373
–8 –0.223 –0.154 –2.113  –1.888*
–7 –0.560 –0.365 –2.388  –2.012*
–6 –1.013 –0.628 –2.668  –2.133*
–5 –1.042 –0.615 –2.772  –2.112*
–4 –1.085 –0.613 –3.286  –2.398*
–3 –0.333 –0.181 –3.405  –2.387*
–2 –0.563 –0.295 –3.352  –2.264*
–1 –0.946 –0.479 –3.770  –2.460*
0 –1.678 –0.822 –3.733  –2.359*
1 –1.991 –0.946 –4.507  –2.763*
2 –1.971 –0.910 –4.571  –2.723*
3 –1.470 –0.661 –4.522  –2.622*
4 –1.302 –0.570 –3.741  –2.114*
5 –1.599 –0.684 –3.942  –2.174*
6 –1.492 –0.623 –4.233  –2.281*
7 –1.687 –0.689 –4.559  –2.403*
8 –2.861 –1.144 –4.123  –2.127*
9 –2.768 –1.084 –3.459  –1.748*
10 –3.660 –1.406 –3.333  –1.652*
11 –3.430 –1.293 –3.007 –1.463
12 –4.198 –1.554 –3.567  –1.704*
13 –4.272 –1.554 –2.977 –1.397
14 –4.772  –1.707* –3.092 –1.427
15 –3.174  –1.760* –3.174 –1.441
Note: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
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5. Conclusion
This study examines the impact of the returning of top executives on average cumulative 
abnormal returns. The results demonstrate that the return of top executives has a signifi-
cantly negative impact on market value. The decision to bring back top executives does 
not necessarily result in improved performance of stock price. Companies are therefore 
advised cautiously to evaluate whether they should change their top executives to avoid 
fluctuations in stock price and damage to the interests of their investors. The return of 
top executives is not expected to have a positive effect on stock price. 
Given the limit of availability for empirical data, examination on the personal attributes 
of the returning top executives is not conducting. As an example, whether top execu-
tives previously stepped down from that office voluntarily or non-voluntarily may result 
in different outcomes upon his return, and this fact may represent a limitation on the 
findings of this study. Meanwhile, the ethics of leadership for top executives might 
influence our findings. 
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